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Evolutionary analysis in law represents, in large
measure, an effort to inform legal thinking with behavioral
biology, in much the same way that we try to inform legal
thinking with economics or psychology.! To the question "What
can legal thinkers usefully learn from behavioral biology?"
there are two typical answers: (1) very little; and (2) a great
deal. Those subscribing to the first answer offer in support of
their conclusions a variety of reasons, to several of which I
respond below. I subscribe to the second answer And the
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occasion of this conference provides an opportunity to explain
why. I believe that the law stands to gain a great deal from the
study of behavioral biology on the basis of three
straightforward and interrelated lines of logic.
First, anything law achieves, it achieves by effecting
changes in human behavior. The ability to deploy legal tools to
effect these changes, at the least cost to society, is largely a
function of the predictive power of the behavioral models on
which law relies-those insights by which we may predict that
if law moves this way, behavior will move that way, rather
than some other way. Therefore, improvements to the
behavioral models may yield improvements in the ability of law
to effect desired changes in human behavior.
Second, evolutionary processes (such as natural and
sexual selection) exert influences on the behavioral
predispositions of all living organisms. Humans are living
organisms. Therefore, evolutionary processes exert influence on
the behavioral predispositions of humans.
Norms: Biology, Morality, and The Disruption of Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2072 (2000)
[hereinafter On the Nature of Norms] (book review). The idea that legal thinkers can
gain from thinking about evolutionary processes is also a common theme among
members of The Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law (SEAL). See
http://www.sealsite.org.
3 For useful introductions to modern behavioral biology, written for the general
audience, see generally TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH, THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN
NATURE: FORGING LINKS BETWEEN EVOLUTION AND BEHAVIOR (1991); STEVEN PINKER,
HOW THE MIND WORKS (1997); MATT RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE
EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE (1994); ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL:
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND EVERYDAY LIFE (1994).
Accessible textbooks include: JOHN ALCOCK, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN
EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (6th ed. 1998); DAVID BUSS, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY:
THE NEW SCIENCE OF THE MIND (2000); MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, SEX,
EVOLUTION, AND BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1983); SCOTT FREEMAN & JON C. HERRON,
EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS (1998); DOUGLAS J. FUTUYMA, EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY (2d
ed. 1986); TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM F. ZIMMERMAN, BIOLOGY, EVOLUTION,
AND HUMAN NATURE (2000); JAMES L. GOULD & CAROL GRANT GOULD, SEXUAL
SELECTION (1989); J.R. KREBS & N.B. DAVIES, AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIOURAL
ECOLOGY (3d ed. 1993); MARK RIDLEY, EVOLUTION (1993); ROBERT TRivERS, SOCIAL
EVOLUTION (1985).
Introductions to law-relevant principles of behavioral biology, written
specifically for legal thinkers without biology backgrounds, appear in Part I: A Primer
in Law-Relevant Evolutionary Biology, in Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra
note 1 at 1127-57; Timothy H. Goldsmith & Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Biology and
Behavior: A Brief Overview and Some Important Concepts, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 131
(1999); William H. Rodgers, Where Environmental Law and Biology Meet: Of Pandas'
Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers, and Effective Law, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 25 (1993).
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Third, and combining the conclusions of the prior two, if
better behavioral models can yield more effective legal tools,
and if human behavior is influenced by evolutionary processes,
then greater knowledge of how evolutionary processes
influence behavior may improve law's ability to regulate it.
An emerging and rapidl growing literature applies
insights about human behavioral biology in efforts to make
law, legal process, and the regulation of human behavior more
effective.' Contexts include, for example, constitutional law,
child abuse, employment law, environmental law, sexual
aggression, political institutions, criminal law, property law,
law and economics, norm origins, and the like.'
4 Some of this literature appears in bibliographic form on the "Readings" pages
of the website of the Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law (SEAL) at
http://www.sealsite.org. See also infra note 5.
'See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis, The Original Constitution and Our Origins, 19
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 251 (1996); Paul Rubin, The State of Nature and the Evolution
of Political Preferences, 3 Ai. L. & ECON. REv. 50 (2001); Todd Zywicki, The Nature of
the State and the State of Nature: A Comment on Grady and McGuire's "The Nature of
Constitutions," 1 J. OF BIOEcONOIICS 241 (1999); Mark Grady & Michael McGuire,
The Nature of Constitutions, 1 J. OF BIOECONOMICS 227 (1999); Jones, Evolutionary
Analysis in Law, supra note 1; Kingsley R. Browne, Sex and Temperament in Modern
Society: A Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 ARIz. L. REV.
972 (1995); Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape, supra note 2; Raymond R.
Coletta, The Measuring Stick of Regulatory Takings: A Biological and Cultural
Analysis, 1 J. CONTEMP. L. 20 (1998); Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality, supra note 2;
Jones, On the Nature of Norms, supra note 2; Owen D. Jones, Law, Biology, and
Emotions, 39 JURIIETRICS J. 283 (1999); Deborah W. Denno, Gender Differences in
Biological and Sociological Predictors of Crime, 22 VT. L. REV. 305 (1998); Lawrence
Frolik, The Biological Roots of the Undue Influence Doctrine: What's Love Got to Do
With It?, 57 U. Prrr. L. REV. 841 (1996); Oliver Goodenough, Biology, Behavior, and
Criminal Law: Seeking a Responsible Approach to an Inevitable Interchange, 22 VT. L.
REV. 263 (1998); Mark Grady & Michael McGuire, A Theory of the Origin of Natural
Law, 8 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISsUEs 87 (1997); Cheryl Hanna, Can A Biological Inquiry
Help Reduce Male Violence Against Women?, 22 VT. L. REV. 333 (1998); Rodgers, Jr.,
supra note 3; E. Donald Elliott, The Tragi-Comedy of the Commons: Evolutionary
Biology, Economics and Environmental Law, 20 VA. ENVIR. L.J. 17 (2001); Jeffrey E.
Stake, Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand Control, 64 TUL. L. REV. 705
(1990); Jeffrey Evans Stake, Are We Buyers or Hosts? A Memetic Approach to the First
Amendment, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1213 (2001); Owen D. Jones, Proprioception, Non-Law,
and Biolegal History, 53 FLA. L. REV. - (forthcoming 2001); Bailey Kuklin, Evolution,
Politics and Law (unpublished manuscript 2000) (on file with author); Paul Rubin,
Darwinian Politics: The Evolution of Political Preferences (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author); Todd J. Zywicki, Evolutionary Biology and the Social Sciences, 13
HUMANE STUD. REV. 1 (2000), at http'//www.humanestudiesreview.orgtfall2000-
/secondframeset.html. (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
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My purpose here is not to reiterate or summarize those
arguments (which, because of their length, detail, and often
technical discussions, are best consulted separately) but rather
to address some of the many concerns I have seen raised in
writing, or at conferences, about efforts to draw useful insights
about humans from the growing body of knowledge about
biological influences on behavior.
I do not mean to suggest that all such concerns are
categorically misguided. For there are a great many thoughtful
and constructive critiques. But I do want to demonstrate that a
number of commonly encountered concerns are misinformed or
misleading, however well-intentioned their proponents may be.
As legal thinkers evaluate the possible and future role for
behavioral biology in law, they will need to separate the useful
and appropriate cautions from the hyperbolic, and the logical
and well-reasoned concerns from the baseless. I hope to offer,
below, some discussion that may assist that effort.
I. SCOPE
The term behavioral biology encompasses many things,
not all of which I intend to address. For purposes here, there
are two principal components to behavioral biology. The first
component is behavioral genetics. It mainly involves efforts to
trace the different behaviors of different individuals to
different genes among them.6 This is, unfortunately, what most
people call to mind when they encounter a discussion of the
influences of biology on behavior. There is a role for behavioral
genetics in law. I think, however, that the long-term promise of
behavioral genetics for law is comparatively limited.
Accordingly, it is not the component of behavioral biology I
intend to discuss here.
The second component, more promising in my view,
goes by many names. None of them are without drawbacks
(traceable, in large measure, to somewhat arbitrary
disciplinary divisions that do not square with behavioral
6 More technically, it traces behavioral differences to different alleles (forms) of
genes. For convenience, however, this Article adopts the common convention of
referring to different alleles as different genes.
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phenomena7). The names include behavioral ecology,
evolutionary ecology, ethology, evolutionary biology,
evolutionary psychology, evolutionary anthropology, and many
others. But the overall enterprise transcends efforts to name it,
and the shared, core idea follows this logic. Evolutionary
processes (such as natural selection and sexual selection)-
together with environmental and physical inputs-built the
brains that yield behaviors. There is therefore a necessary and
important relationship between the non-random operation of
these evolutionary processes and observable human behaviors.
For reasons explained below, that relationship yields widely-
shared (often species-typical) heritable behavioral
predispositions that are often highly condition-dependent.
(That is, they are context-specific, rather than automatic.) As a
consequence, some of the different behaviors we observe, from
different individuals, can be traced not to different genes, but
rather to widely-shared species-typical information-processing
algorithms that encounter different environmental contexts.
This sounds more difficult than it is. To both clarify and
oversimplify, one can consider that behavioral geneticists study
how, when encountering the exact same environment,
organism A will respond with behavior X, and organism B will
respond with behavior Y, when A and B have different genes
relevant to that behavior, manifested in slightly different
neural architecture, brain structure, and function.
In important contrast to those interested in behavioral
genetics, those interested in the evolutionary bases of species-
typical behaviors study how, when encountering different
environments, A and B may still respond with behaviors X and
Y respectively, despite the fact that neither their genes nor
their neural architectures differ materially. For example,
evolutionary processes may have equipped the entire
population with a conditional decisional rule that A and B
share, which in over-simplified essence provides: "if in
environment E, then employ behavior X, but if in environment
F then employ behavior Y." Thus, the shared genetic influences
on behavior can yield behaviors X and Y from individuals A
and B not because of their genetic differences, but simply
because they encountered environments E and F, respectively.
7 See infra section IV.A.8 For background on these processes, see supra note 3.
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The behavior is enormously influenced by the environment, but
the environment affects the probability of behavior in ways
reflecting the influence of widely-shared behavioral
predispositions. The distinction between behavioral genetics
and behavioral ecology is difficult to overemphasize, and is
illustrated in Figure 1.
To be clear, then, where I use the term behavioral
biology here it will be to refer to this latter component of
behavioral biology-this attention to evolved, condition-
dependent, behavior-influencing algorithms that influence the
way the brain processes information and increases or decreases
the probabilities of various behaviors. An evolutionary analysis
in law is, in part, the effort to bring that component of
behavioral biology into legal thinking, with the emphasis on
what can be learned about law-relevant human behaviors from
the study of evolutionary processes that have influenced them.'
9 The term evolutionary analysis in law first appears in Jones, Evolutionary
Analysis in Law, supra note 1. This was not the first time that law and behavioral
biology had been linked. The general idea that legal thinkers should take account of
the influence of human biological heritage on human behavior relevant to law has been
raised on numerous occasions, in a variety of contexts. Such work provides important
background for all that I attempt here. See, e.g., RICHARD ALEXANDER, DARWINISM AND
HUMAN AFFAIRS (1979) (containing chapter on "Evolution, Law, and Justice"); JOHN H.
BECKSTROM, EVOLUTIONARY JURISPRUDENCE: PROSPECTS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE
USE OF MODERN DARWINISM THROUGHOUT THE LEGAL PROCESS (1989) (discussing
advantages and limits of using evolutionary theory in legal thinking); THE SENSE OF
JUSTICE: BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW (Roger Masters & Margaret Gruter eds.,
1992); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992); Amicus Brief of the Gruter
Institute, In Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); Browne, supra note 5; E.
Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The New Synthesis?, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 595 (1997);
Robin Fox, In the Matter of "Baby M". Report from the Gruter Institute for Law and
Behavioral Research, 7 POLITICS & THE LIFE SCIENCES 77 (1988); Frolik, supra note 5;
Goodenough, supra note 5; Grady & McGuire, supra note 5; Margaret Gruter, Law in
Sociobiological Perspective, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 181 (1977); Monika Gruter Morhenn
& Margaret Gruter, The Evolution of Law and Biology, in EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES
IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES: TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN NATURE
119 (Steven A. Peterson & Albert Somit eds., 2001); Hanna, supra note 5; McGinnis,
supra note 5; William Rodgers, Bringing People Back: Toward a Comprehensive Theory
of Takings in Natural Resources Law, 10 ECOLOGY L. Q. 205 (1982); Jeffrey E. Stake,
Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand Control, 64 TUL. L. REV. 705 (1990);
Margo Wilson, Impact of the Uncertainty of Paternity on Family Law, 45 U. TORONTO
FAC. L. REV. 217, 223 (1987); E. Donald Elliott & Roger Masters, Ethology of Law:
Biological Bases of Legal Behavior, Seminar offered at Yale Law School (1988); Jones,
Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 1, at 1121-23 n.3.
I maintain a partial listing of many other sources relevant to the connection
between law and evolution on the "Readings" page of the website for the Society for














topics has grown quickly, due in part to programs organized since 1981 by the Gruter
Institute for Law and Behavioral Research (about which see http://www.gruter-
institute.org) and more recently by the Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law.
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II. WHY LAW NEEDS BEHAVIORAL BIOLOGY
As mentioned above, the better law's model of behavior,
the better law can help to fulfill the goals society assigns to it.
Any model of behavior that ignores the biology of behavior-
through the effect of evolutionary processes on brain function-
is materially incomplete. There are at least two reasons.
First, all organisms, and all of their behaviors, are
products of the interaction of environment and genes.
Therefore, were legal thinkers to attend only to environmental
influences (as they often do) or only to genetic influences (as,
thankfully, they may never do) it would inevitably hamper
development of an integrated and fully informed model of
human behavior. It would be like trying to understand cake by
studying only flour, or trying to understand lemonade by
studying only sugar-necessary, but absurdly incomplete.
Second, all behavior is the product of two interrelated
but very different kinds of causes: the immediate and the
evolutionary. (Or, to use the biologists' terms of art, the
"proximate" and the "ultimate."') The effort of legal thinkers to
understand causes of behavior is needlessly narrowed if it
attends only to one of these two fundamental kinds of causes,
the latter of which is a principal subject of behavioral biology.
The net result is this. While the human brain is
remarkable, it is also corporeal. Brains exist because natural
selection has favored information-processing, behavior-biasing
machines, the benefits of which (measured in contributions to
genetic fitness") have historically exceeded the costs (measured
1o See, e.g., John Alcock & Paul Sherman, The Utility of the Proximate-Ultimate
Dichotomy in Ethology, 96 ETHOLOGY 58 (1994).
n It is important to note that genetic success, or "fitness," is not measured in
offspring alone, because offspring are not the only genetic relatives an individual has.
Since relatives other than offspring, such as siblings and parents, also share genes
with an individual (because of recent shared ancestors), their own reproductive success
can in some circumstances contribute to an individual's fitness. When calculating
fitness, one therefore needs to take account of the extent to which an individual has
increased the reproductive success of its relatives (discounted by their degree of
relatedness), beyond the reproductive success those relatives would have had in the
absence of the individual's contributions. This cumulative, additive calculation of
fitness, which takes account of both direct and indirect replication of genes, is known
as "inclusive fitness." See ALCOCK, supra note 3, at 561-69. Consequently, an organism
can increase its overall genetic success by increasing its inclusive fitness, even if it does
not itself have offspring.
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in, for example, energy, as well as the material necessary for
building and running a large and energy-hungry brain12).
The patterns in which brains process information that
lead to behaviors are inevitably affected by evolutionary
processes. For there are many more ways for an organism to
meet an environmental challenge disastrously than there are
ways to ensure continued survival and eventual reproduction.
Those genetically influenced physical processing architectures
that tended to yield behaviors that tended, on average, to lead
to reproductive success simply tend, in turn, to become
widespread in populations.13 (This shared neural networking is
sometimes referred to as a species-typical psychology or an
evolved psychology.) If legal thinkers are charged with
regulating behaviors, and if understanding the causes of
behaviors aids in regulating them, then familiarity with
behavioral biology should be important to legal thinkers.
Some of the premises of this line of reasoning are not
without their critics. As always, some criticism is constructive,
and some not. In my view, a great deal of the constructive
criticism has already been incorporated into the recent work of
evolutionary biologists and psychologists. A not inconsiderable
portion of the remaining criticism is, however, unsound and
more likely to mislead than to help. Consequently, what follows
offers several observations for those unaccustomed to thinking
about evolutionary analysis in law.
This is by no means, of course, an exhaustive treatment.
In particular, I want to avoid simply reiterating the best-
known and most frequently-identified flaws in fact or logic that
12 The human brain's unique capacities are, in part, a function of its size. Yet
its size requires that human babies be born less physically developed, and therefore
more vulnerable, than other primate babies-lest larger cranial size pose even greater
birthing problems than it already does. In addition, the brain requires remarkable
quantities of energy to run: roughly twenty percent of all calories consumed, despite
being only two percent of body mass. PATRICIA SMITH CHURCHLAND,
NEUROPHILOSOPHY 36-37 (1986). This is roughly twenty-two times as much energy as
that required to nourish an equivalent weight of muscle, at rest. STEVEN MITHEN, THE
PREHISTORY OF MIND 11 (1996). See also Adam Gifford, Jr., Being and Time: On the
Nature and the Evolution of Institutions, 1 J. BIOECONOMICS 127, 136-37 (1999).
13 Technically, and because of inevitable time lag between environmental
changes and adaptation, what matters is the extent to which such behaviors tended to
increase reproductive success in deep ancestral, rather than current, environments.
Different adaptations arose at different times, obviously, but the relevant time for a




are apparent in a number of common objections to evolutionary
reasoning.14 Instead, I want first to address briefly some of the
more systemic and surface barriers to integrating behavioral
biology into law, in furtherance of evolutionary analysis in law.
I will then explore some of the deeper, subsurface conditions
that I believe are fundamental predicates to those more
observable, surface ones.
III. SURFACE BARRIERS TO INTEGRATION
A. Unsupported Claims of Ad Hocery
Critics sometimes fault evolutionists for seeking to
explain everything in evolutionary terms, on the premise that
a principle that explains everything explains nothing. The
criticism has intuitive appeal and, in some instances, it has
undoubtedly helped to chasten theorists against too-facile
hypotheses, which sometimes seem to be ad hoc. The challenge,
of course, is to distinguish between more and less legitimate
hypotheses. And in our efforts to do so, three things bear
noting.
First, it is quite clear that an effort to reconcile every
observable behavior with evolutionary history is insufficient to
render resultant explanations ad hoc. By comparison, we
observe that rocks fall, birds fly, and hot air balloons rise. But
no one would ever fault a physicist for claiming that each of
these phenomena-no matter how disparate-must either
reconcile with the theory of gravity or force the most
fundamental reevaluation. We make this strong claim because
the theory of gravity, while not perfect, is backed by such
overwhelming evidence that we consider it very robust. The
14 For instance, I trust that most readers will be familiar with the proposition
that any attempt to reason directly from a description to a normative conclusion (from
an "is" to an "ought") is impermissible, since explanation is not justification, in either
logic or in law. Also, I trust it is evident, without further explanation, that accusing
behavioral biologists of genetic determinism is naive, since no credible behavioral
biologist believes that genes rigidly determine human behavior. For lengthier
discussion of these and related points, see Jones, Sex, Culture, and The Biology of
Rape, supra note 2, at 877-80, 893-95.
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first time we see a balloon rise as a rock falls we may be
puzzled, but no one would either abandon the theory of gravity
or declaim its practitioners for attempting to sweep too much
under its auspices. Attraction of object to object by
gravitational forces is foundational, and while it may take time
to puzzle out how things may rise or fall, we are confident that
the mechanisms by which they do so reflect the relentless
effects of gravity.
Similarly, it is not only acceptable but presently
required, given the current state of science and the dictates of
logic, that we start from the presumption that all human
behavior, whether rational or irrational, cooperative or
competitive, must in the end reconcile with known evolutionary
processes-or force the most sweeping and fundamental
revision. While there are still debates about details of evolution
on the margin (just as there continue to be debates among
those studying gravity), the theory of evolution by natural
selection is no less robust than the theory of gravitational
attraction of mass to mass. We may not know by what precise
pathways natural selection leaves a big-brained species
capable of consciousness. That it has, however, remains
undisputed. We may not yet discern the cognitive processes by
which we reach specific decisions, develop our various
preferences, or give content to emotional realities. But the
conclusion that the cognitive processes must inevitably reflect
both the guiding and scarring of natural selection and other
evolutionary processes has not been significantly challenged by
any comprehensive, alternative, non-supernatural theory.
Second, it would be gross error to assume that, simply
because every behavior must square with evolutionary history
or overthrow it, each causal hypothesis is as easy as another,
affording no basis for preference or rejection. One occasionally
hears the view that evolutionary theories may be disregarded,
because their explanations necessarily cut equally in opposite
directions, offering no measure of comparative probabilities.
The criticism seems to be based on the mistaken belief that one
can always construct two equally plausible evolutionary
accounts that could explain both what is observed and the
opposite of what is observed.
20011
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For example, a critic might think that natural selection
is just as likely to have favored perfect rationality as
irrationality, and conclude on that basis that evolutionary
theorizing can offer nothing reliable at present to the study of
irrationality. After all, would it not be adaptive to be able to
reason without logical flaws? But such thinking would reflect a
serious misapprehension of the very basics of evolutionary
processes. Specifically, the fact that natural selection would
have favored a trait, if it arose, says precisely nothing about
the likelihood that the trait exists. Evolution is path-dependent
(you must always get here from there), with natural selection
inexorably sifting among contemporaneously existing heritable
traits (varying by genetic mutation and recombination). Such
sifting favors reproductively useful traits, but it does not create
them. For, as biologist Richard Dawkins once put it, no one
would expect pigs to have wings, even if they would come in
handy from time to time. And, similarly, natural selection
cannot build an all-purpose optimizing machine, even if it
would be beneficial to have one.
Natural selection cannot look forward. Problems do not
generate mutational solutions. And natural selection never
guarantees optimality. Whatever heritable abilities exist exist
only because they were left over after alternative traits,
somewhat less likely to contribute to reproductive success,
were gradually swept away in the relentless process that
affords compounded gains over time to even small reproductive
advantages. We have absolutely no reason to believe that
natural selection has afforded humans an optimal brain, or one
capable of choosing and inclined to choose the most appropriate
behavior for achieving any end-even reproductive success. It
just doesn't work that way. Consequently, evolutionary
hypotheses are always seriously constrained by the empirical
facts of our own evolutionary history, by the limits of what
evolution can achieve, and the significantly channeled
processes by which it achieves anything. It is simply not the




B. Unsupported Specificity Thresholds
Some have argued that the utility of behavioral biology
in law is severely limited because its predictions are
insufficiently specific. There are three principal replies.
First, insufficiently specific compared to what?
Certainly less specific predictions are less valuable than more
specific predictions, in those cases in which the predictions,
while varying in specificity, are equally accurate. For example,
if the prediction that it will rain on a given day is consistently
correct, and so is the prediction that it will begin to rain on a
given day at a certain time, plus or minus thirty minutes, the
method for generating the latter prediction will be more useful
in predicting tomorrow's precipitation. Nevertheless, it should
be obvious that even the most general predictions are valuable
if they are more accurate than alternative predictions-
particularly when there are none. And there are certainly
numerous law-relevant contexts in which there are at present
simply no systematic ways of predicting important behavioral
phenomena.15
Second, we should not categorically disparage the value
of predictions that lack the specificity we would ideally prefer.
The fact that behavioral biology is unlikely to ever predict with
both specificity and certainty that person X will behave in way
Y in response to environmental factor Z does little to erode its
overall value. This is because there frequently is great value in
even general predictions. Consider meteorology. Learning that
there is a 50% probability of rain, sometime today or tomorrow,
somewhere in the general region, has proven value. 6 Consider
medicine. Being told that there is, historically, a roughly 1 in
200 probability that a given treatment will succeed is useful to
know, even if one cannot know for certain how a given body, of
given age, given sex, given weight, a given medical history, and
a given diet will respond. Consider geology. Even the most
general predictions of whether a volcano is likely to be active,
whether an earthquake is more likely to strike here than there,
or whether oil is more likely there than here are all valuable-
"See, e.g., Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality, supra note 2.
'6 See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social
Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1047 (1989)
("meteorology is [another] example of the value of even uncertain predictions.").
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often extremely valuable-despite their characteristic
imprecision. And consider the marketplace. We routinely feel
justified consulting various economic indicators, to glean an
important sense of what the future may hold, despite the fact
that predictions are notoriously uncertain and imprecise.
Certainty and narrow specificity are by no means prerequisites
for value.
Third, we should not establish a higher specificity
threshold for behavioral biology than for other disciplines upon
which law regularly relies. The disciplines of psychology,
sociology, psychiatry, and even toxicology often provide
insights afforded some deference by the law, despite the fact
that their predictions are often quite general, and, like
predictions generated by behavioral biology, only probabilistic.
C. Unsupported Claims of Reductionism
Some claim that humans are too complex for behavioral
biology to offer any worthwhile insights. In the breathless
rhetoric of some romantics, human life is just far too
artistically rich and complicated to be usefully broken down
into pieces and studied. The following comment is typical:
"[Lliving organisms must be understood not as reducible to
their genes but as following a lifeline trajectory,
simultaneously product and process, being and becoming."17
This moving appeal to transcendental duality and its
categorical imperviousness to consideration of divisible
elements is, I believe, quite overstated.
First, there simply are no dark devils out there actually
claiming such an extreme position-that humans are
"reducible to their genes." Damning the reductionism of
behavioral biology is, in my view, to point an unloaded finger
at no one.
Second, and relatedly, the epithet "reductionist" is
hurled rather indiscriminately and over-broadly at anyone
suggesting human behavior is materially influenced by
evolutionary processes. Of course there may be some accounts
17 Hilary Rose & Steven Rose, Introduction in ALAS POOR DARWIN 1, 14 (Hilary
Rose & Steven Rose eds., 2000) (summarizing Steven Rose's arguments in his own
chapter, later in the book).
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that surface, typically in the works of people who are not
behavioral biologists, claiming that people are mere puppets of
string-pulling genes, utterly devoid of free will. But these views
are confused, incredible, rare, and insignificant for any
practical purpose. And there are many ways to attend to the
evolved components of a species-typical human psychology
without overreducing. No one believes the essence of humanity
resides in the proper understanding of the electron orbits of
which the body is comprised. Similarly, no one thinks the study
of copper, steel, and other components would afford full
appreciation of a high performance sports car. Likewise, no one
thinks humans are mere automata, wholly definable as the
sum of their DNA. Nevertheless, bodies, brains, and cars are
all composed of constituent elements. And they are all products
of knowable processes that leave them designed to perform
certain tasks. The anti-reductionist position has some virtues,
for it cautions us against neglecting the whole for the parts.
But no competent understanding of the whole can ignore the
parts. Studying the influences of evolutionary processes on
gene frequencies, and of gene frequencies on human behavior,
is not in itself improperly reductionistic.
D. Overzealous Belief in Empiricism
Sometimes one hears skepticism of evolutionism
wrapped in empiricism. This stems, apparently, from a belief
that if one collects data, and studies it closely enough, relevant
patterns of human behavior can be observed, and predictions
will ensue with greater reliability than those a theory (like that
undergirding behavioral biology) can provide. Such an
approach is evident, for example, in the effort of some
behavioral law and economics scholars to introduce more
cognitive psychology into law. There is no question: empirical
work is often important and useful. It can yield new insights,
as well as accurate, data-driven predictions. Nonetheless, there
are three responses to this approach.
First, data and statistics neither compile nor explain
themselves. The data are a function of the way we choose
among infinite possibilities what data to collect, and how to
organize that data. These processes, in turn, often reflect
presuppositions that may be wrong. And false suppositions can
2001]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
unintendedly obscure law-relevant behavior patterns.18 A
wholly data-driven approach is often a trial-and-error
approach-sure to yield some useful insights, but incapable of
reaching them as quickly as empirical work that is firmly
grounded in, informed by, and partnered with robust theory.
Second, people are often loathe to ascribe legal
relevance to data, however clear, without plausible causal
explanations. Suppose, for example, that someone produced
unimpeachable data indicating that over the last ten years
100% of the jurors who wore an orange tie during voir dire for a
criminal case voted to convict. Few would argue that when a
prospective juror wears an orange tie it should now provide a
basis for the judge to strike the juror for cause. Contrast,
however, the probable practical implications if similarly strong
data correlated reflexive votes to convict to membership in the
(hypothetical) anti-crime vigilante group: Protectors of the
Realm. Hesitation to ascribe legal relevance to data lacking
causal explanations is especially probable when data are
inconsistent with firmly held presuppositions. But a moment's
reflection makes obvious that people are often similarly
skeptical even absent any presuppositions whatsoever. We are
simply often skeptical of data disembodied from plausible
causal mechanisms.
Third, it is important to remember that behavioral
biology is itself a highly empirical enterprise. Articles
expanding our knowledge about biological influences on
behavior appear in dozens of peer-reviewed journals, report
thousands of findings annually, and are based on behavioral
observations, hypothesis testing, and both.
"' Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 1, at 1229-31. For example,
before biologists and evolutionary psychologists published theories and evidence
regarding evolved discriminative parental solicitude, and evolved (and highly context
specific) predispositions toward infanticide of unrelated but unweaned infants, no one
bothered to collect child abuse data in a systematic way that differentiated stepparents
from natural parents. People had been studying child abuse for decades, without
thinking to collect and scrutinize information on the kinship variable. Data on
relatedness was an obvious prerequisite to analysis of victimization rates and
comparative risks. Eventually, and as predicted by those studying the biology of
behavior, it was shown that patterns of child abuse and infanticide in humans closely
follow predictable patterns of neglect and infanticide in all the many other species in
which the behaviors regularly occur. For an overview of this research, see id.
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E. Fears of Misuse
Most people are clearly more comfortable swallowing
unpronounceable chemicals in a drug, developed with
imperfect knowledge of physiological biology, than they are
swallowing the idea that the legal system might be improved,
by efforts reflecting an imperfect knowledge of behavioral
biology. I submit that this is rather peculiar.
Part of the explanation for this peculiarity likely lies in
widespread fears of the public misuse of biological information.
The potential for misusing behavioral biology is undeniable.
Though this, alone, is insufficient to support any conclusion.
(For, after all, many common features of daily life, such as
electricity, can be both dangerous and useful.) The oft-voiced
fear of misuse could usefully be divided into two main kinds:
the unfounded fears and the founded fears.
Unfounded fears of misuse tend to flow from all-too-
common mistakes of fact, as when people harbor mistaken
assumptions about behavioral biology and conclude that
biological knowledge (as they perceive it to be) should be
excluded from some arena of human affairs. For example,
people often incorrectly assume that any invocation of
behavioral biology would necessarily invoke behavioral
genetics, with its emphasis on difference, rather than
commonality. They therefore presume that behavioral biology
will most often be used, if at all, in the courtroom-to
exculpate, or to mitigate the sentences of, criminal defendants.
This factual assumption is wrong, rendering such concerns,
however sincere, unfounded.
Founded fears of misuse come in two very different
kinds, often lumped together in discourse: (1) fears of innocent
misuse; and (2) fears of intentional misuse. Innocent misuses
might stem either from people in some position of influence or
power who misunderstand behavioral biology and therefore
misuse its insights, or from people who fully and accurately
appreciate the biology, yet inadvertently misuse it nonetheless.
Intentional misuses would be those in which people invoke the
perceived authority of biology to further pernicious ends,
whether they understand the biology or not.
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Members of society, and scholars in particular, should
remain vigilant for misuse, and take reasonable precautions to
prevent it. But the fact of the matter is that every useful tool-
mechanical or disciplinary-can be misunderstood or misused.
Behavioral biology is not unique in this regard. And one
appropriate answer to misunderstanding or misuse of
potentially valuable tools is education, caution, and oversight-
not the wholesale exclusion for which some commentators
argue. If the potential dangers of misusing evolutionary
analysis in law are particularly troubling, let us improve the
systems by which we educate people about behavioral biology
and oversee legal decision-making processes. Improvements to
these systems will decrease the probabilities that people will
misunderstand or misuse behavioral biology.
F. Unbalanced Attention to Costs
One possible response to my argument that fears of
misuse must be tempered is that our caution should rise in
proportion to the costs of error. If, by virtue of incorporating
bio-behavioral information into the process by which we
regulate the behavior of human beings with the tools of law, we
may harm the very citizens we seek to protect, and whose
economic and personal thriving we seek to encourage, then we
must tread timidly. I am not yet persuaded. At least not in the
absence of more rigorous cost-benefit analysis than has ever
been offered.
Here is why. It is true that the costs of misuse of
different tools can vary considerably. (Compare, for example,
misusing a blender to misusing a nuclear reactor.) But these
potential costs of use can never legitimately be considered in
isolation. There are equally important costs to foregone use, as
well, and these are routinely ignored. To illustrate, consider
that most people tend to care more about one life lost to a
prematurely approved drug than to two lives lost on account of
failing to receive a drug whose governmental approval was
unduly delayed. If one cares principally about lost lives, this
makes no sense.
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Just as there is no way to conclude that the costs of
relying on a false positive categorically exceed the costs of
relying on a false negative, there is no way to conclude-a
priori-that the costs of informing legal efforts to regulate
behavior with behavioral biology categorically exceed the costs
of not so informing legal efforts, if that would have yielded
benefits. That is, no argument from a parade of horribles,
following further integration of biology into law, can be
persuasive without comparing that parade to the parade of
horribles the absence of such integration would continue to
allow.
We live in a world that contains-despite its many
loves, virtues, and beauties-violent international and
domestic confrontations, sexual coercion, deception, avarice,
theft, environmental degradation, and zero-sum quests for
status, to name but a few. It is entirely unclear to me that, in
the end, even the imperfect introduction of behavioral biology
into legal thinking would be more costly than unduly delaying
that introduction, if the window on human behavior thereby
gained may afford us some meaningful opportunity to reduce
behaviors that we deem detrimental, and to encourage
behaviors we deem constructive.
IV. UNDERLYING BARRIERS TO INTEGRATION
The foregoing concerns, significant as they are,
nonetheless represent, in my view, mere surface
manifestations of four far deeper problems. I call these:
Tortured Taxonomy; Excessive Exceptionalism; the Burden of
Proof Switcheroo; and the Argument from Missing Mechanism.
A. Tortured Taxonomy
Path dependence is the tendency of arbitrary or later-
obsolesced initial choices or developments to lock in,
impervious to superior alternatives that come along.19
'9 The QWERTY keyboard is the classic example. For more on path
dependence, see generally Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics,
109 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996); Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms,
78 B.U. L. REV. 813 (1998); Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The
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Nowhere, in my view, are the pernicious effects and enduring
costs of path dependence more obvious than in our inherited
taxonomy of university departments. In particular, the
historical division of the natural sciences (including the life
sciences, such as biology) from the social sciences (such as
sociology and anthropology) continues to yield much mischief,
as those attempting to learn something about human behavior,
specifically, leave unconsulted those who actually specialize in
the study of behavior, generally.
True, division of academic labor, when investigating the
world's phenomena, yields some notable efficiencies. But there
are at least four separate problems with Tortured Taxonomy
that give rise to some of the surface barriers to integration
mentioned above in Part III.
First, the neat division of labor was never intended to
suggest the neat division of reality. And the academic tail has
come to wag our understanding of the dog. Increasingly, it
seems, academics expect reality to conform to our own
discipline's necessarily limited models, rather than trying to
synthesize knowledge among disciplines to bring the models
closer to reality. This is a variation of the problem: when you
have but a hammer, everything's a nail.
Second, taxonomic divisions generate tribal
vocabularies, rendering inter-disciplinary communication
difficult, and giving rise to misunderstandings that generate
needless hostilities. One example: the word "strategies" in the
biological term of art "reproductive strategies" was
misunderstood by non-biologists to carry a positive normative
connotation. An entire volume of essays, wholly misbegotten,
ensued." Another example: the word "theory" in the term of art
Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601
(2001); Frederick W. Lambert, Path Dependent Inefficiency in the Corporate Contract:
The Uncertain Case with Less Certain Implications, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1077 (1998).
20 In 1983, psychology Professor Delbert D. Thiessen was invited to give a
"Fellow's Address" at the meeting of the Division for Comparative and Physiological
Psychology at the annual convention of the American Psychological Association. He
entitled his talk "Rape as a Reproductive Strategy- Our Evolutionary Legacy." In
advance of the talk, several critics charged that the title, as publicized, was offensive
because it suggested that rape was an acceptable method for procreating. Hostile
reaction inspired a small book from the critics: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A
CRITIQUE OF THE SOCIOBIOLOGY OF RAPE (Suzanne R. Sunday & Ethel Tobach eds.,
1985) [hereinafter VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN], in which some history of this episode is
recounted. This unfortunate incident is traceable, in large part, to the cross-
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"evolutionary theory" is routinely misunderstood as suggesting
something purely hypothetical-the result of mere conjecture
and opinion-as the term often implies in many other
disciplines (including, of course, law).
Third, taxonomic divisions yield not only a plethora of
different methods of inquiry (not, in itself, necessarily a
problem) but also a lack of familiarity with the methods of
other disciplines. For example, scientific method is more often
adverted to than understood, with the result that the
significance of findings and the implications of scientific
studies are often over- or under-credited by those in non-
scientific disciplines.
Fourth, and relatedly, the taxonomic divisions we
continue to maintain unduly obscure important disciplinary
content from related but nearly hermetically sealed disciplines.
A startling example is the long history, within several
disciplines, of claims that only the human species exhibits
sexual aggression. This has long been known to be
unequivocally false, as evidenced by numerous articles in the
biological literature. 1
B. Excessive Exceptionalism
Much of the criticism of evolutionary perspectives on
human behavior appears to flow from misplaced pride.
Behavioral biology explores commonalities between humans
and other animals. And we simply don't like that. Indeed, it
appears that many people's pride has ossified to the point that
they prefer to ignore or deny that Homo sapiens sapiens is just
disciplinary ambiguity of the term of art "reproductive strategy"-which has a
normative implication in lay minds, and no such implication to evolutionists. See, e.g.,
Julie Blackman, The Language of Sexual Violence: More Than a Matter of Semantics,
in VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra, at 115, 126 ("Strategies and legacies are
connotatively positive....").
21 However people may differ on whether forced copulation in other species
should or should not be labeled rape, and however people may disagree on whether or
not the study of forced copulation in the many other species in which it occurs can yield
useful insights about patterns of human rape, the fact remains that forced copulation
does occur in many other species, including some of our closest primate relatives. For
an overview, see Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape, supra note 2. See also
Owen D. Jones, Law and the Biology of Rape: Reflections on Transitions, 11 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L. J. 151 (2000); Owen D. Jones, Realities of Rape: Of Science and Politics,
Causes and Meanings, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1386 (2001).
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one species among many primate species, and one kind of
animal, among millions. It is a strong accusation to say that
pride is a principal barrier to wider acceptance of behavioral
biology, but I believe it is an accurate one.
All species are unique, of course, by definition. But we
have generally preferred to believe, pace Orwell, that some
species are more unique than others, and that our own
uniqueness is-well-unique. When Copernicus revealed as
false our belief that Earth was the center of everything, we
retreated to the less bold claim that we, among all life, sprang
full-blown from time-the favored creature of a special Creator.
When Darwin shrank the probability of that toward zero, we
retreated into successively more humble claims. We thought
ourselves the only tool users ... until many other species were
found to use tools.22 We thought ourselves alone capable of
culture . . . until we found unequivocal evidence of inter-
generational transmission and local variation of culture in
other animals.23 More recently, even our basic patterns of
rhythms, tones, and repetitions in music have been shown to
share deep commonalities with the songs of other creatures,
from birds to whales.24
Human history is nothing if not a study in hubris. And
we likely resist evolutionary perspectives on human behavior
because the supposedly unique origin of our behavior is our
last conceit. There is, I submit, some pathos in this. We would
immediately label as absurd the idea that human anatomy is
wholly unlike the anatomy of other animals. There are
22 Species as diverse as chimpanzees and crows have demonstrated the
abilities not only to use tools, but to fashion them from raw materials. See, e.g.,
Yukimaru Sugiyama, Tool Use by Wild Chimpanzees, 367 NATURE 327 (1994); Gavin
R. Hunt, Manufacture and Use of Hook-Tools by New Caledonian Crows, 379 NATURE
249 (1996).
A recent study addressing all accumulated reports of chimpanzee cultural
transmission showed that we are not alone in having intergenerational and non-
genetic transmission of novel information and forms of behavior. See generally Frans
B. M. de Waal, Cultural Primatology Comes of Age, 399 NATURE 635 (1999); Andrew
Whiten et al., Cultures in Chimpanzees, 399 NATURE 682 (1999); Andrew Whiten &
Christopher Boesch, The Cultures of Chimpanzees, SCI. A. 61 (Jan. 2001); FRANS DE
WAAL, THE APE AND THE SUSHI MASTER: CULTURAL REFLECTIONS BY A PRIMATOLOGIST
(2001). 4 See generally Patricia M. Gray et al., The Music of Nature and the Nature of




recognized and accepted commonalities in the way nervous
systems work, the way hearts function, or the common origins
and composition of skeletal structure. If radiation kills rats,
maybe it will kill humans too. If megadoses of a substance
cause cancer in mice, perhaps the substance will adversely
affect humans, too. We accept that evolutionary processes
operate universally, on all life, when generating physical form.
And yet, in contrast, we balk at the notion of behavioral
commonalities. When other species are shown to behave
irrationally, to abuse offspring, to display sexual aggression, or
to aid others in times of need,' we have rushed to ignore it-
assuming that our own behaviors spring from wholly unique
founts of origin.
The dichotomy between form and behavior, however, is
artificial. The form of any animal is worthless (not to mention
quickly dead) without a suite of inherited behavioral
predispositions making the heart beat, the antibodies attack,
the stomach churn, and the adults prefer sex to suicide. The
fact that these predispositions are varied, subtle, and context-
specific rather than automatic, and probabilistic rather than
deterministic, does not mean they are non-existent,
unknowable, or random. Often, these patterns of behavior are
not only consistent with what is known about evolutionary
processes, but also strikingly consistent with behavioral
patterns in other animals. Were we to become more accepting
of this fact, it might lead us to re-think some of our approaches
to the legal control of human behavior, perhaps leading to more
effective and efficient achievement of our own pre-articulated
goals.
C. The Burden of Proof Switcheroo
If there is one lesson for future rhetoriticians from the
history of criticisms leveled at evolutionists (other than be sure
to cast the first and catchiest slogans) it is this: put the burden
of proof on those with whom you disagree. As lawyers well
know, who bears the burden of proof, and what standard must
be met to meet that burden, are often dispositive matters.
"See sources cited supra note 2.
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What bears proving is a function of one's prior
presumption, the default position to be maintained if the
burden of proof is not carried. For many people skeptical of the
utility of behavioral biology, apparently, the proper
presumption is that all important human behaviors are
learned, or socioculturally constructed, unless proven
otherwise. (This is a variation on the theme: if it walks like a
duck, and talks like a duck, it is probably a social construction
of a duck.)
This switcheroo is illogical and improper. It gets the
burden of proof precisely backwards. What bears proving is not
that human behavior is importantly influenced by a suite of
evolved predispositions, as are the behaviors of all other living
organisms, but that it is not. The burden of proof switcheroo is,
in large measure, a product of latent Excessive Exceptionalism.
But as that exceptionalism is misplaced, so too are a number of
the presumptions that have driven self-congratulatory
resistance to human behavioral biology.
When there is a sound theoretical basis for how a
behavioral predisposition (say, affection for healthy offspring,
or any of the other basic emotions) has arisen evolutionarily,
when there is abundant observational or experimental
evidence that relevant species display that predisposition in
patterns predicted by hypotheses derived from the theoretical
foundation, and when humans, too, display the same patterns,
then the proper presumption is that humans do so influenced,
in part and importantly, by similarly evolved behavioral
predispositions.
This is, of course, reasoning that relies on the higher
value of parsimony, in scientific method, than of its many
alternatives. There is no reason to believe that a more
parsimonious explanation is necessarily true. But there is
ample reason to believe that the more parsimonious
explanations should provide the presumption that determines
the allocation of the burden of proof.
I am not suggesting that calculating presumption is
simple or formulaic. There are many different factors, in
addition to those mentioned above, that can have bearing on
the allocation, and suggest that common patterns or features
can be the result of different evolutionary pathways.
Nonetheless, it is quite clear that the burden of proof
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switcheroo has too hastily, too often, and too often unjustifiably
been used to protect the suspiciously convenient and
demonstrably preferred bastion of human exceptionalism that
those most resistant to bio-behavioral science fight to preserve.
D. The Argument From Missing Mechanism
A variation on the Burden of Proof Switcheroo is what
might be called The Argument from Missing Mechanism. It
goes like this: if you cannot identify which alleles yield X
behavior, then you have no business arguing that we should
believe that X behavior is biologically influenced. This is
patently absurd.
Surely the more information biologists can provide
about mechanisms the more thoroughly we can understand
behavioral phenomena, and the more confidence we can have
in believing that the phenomena are significantly influenced by
genetic or evolutionary processes. But it does not follow that
identifying a mechanism is a prerequisite to proper confidence
in a conclusion.
For example, there are a great many phenomena that
we have every reason to believe are genetically influenced,
despite the fact we haven't any clue precisely how. We do not
know which genes are responsible for hunger, for the suckling
behavior of an infant, for the erection of an adult male, for the
reflex that withdraws us from hot surfaces, for sleep, for sexual
desire, and the like. And yet no one seriously doubts that these
are all influenced by a suite of genes widespread throughout
our species.
The confidence comes from triangulating many different
facts. These include the evolutionary significance of the
behavior, the extent to which the behavior is widespread in the
animal kingdom generally, and closer relatives in particular,





That evolutionary analysis in law can provide useful
insights, by integrating behavioral biology with existing models
of behavior, is clear. While none pretend that it offers
talismanic, magical qualities, it is hard to ignore the fact that
behavior is fundamentally a biological phenomenon, and hard
to argue that less knowledge of behavior is more useful than
more knowledge.
As with any invocation of evolution, and as with any
attempt to argue that the study of biology can yield important
insights into human behavior, there will always be critics.
Critics are useful for chastening unbridled enthusiasm, which
unchecked might sweep some unsound conclusions along in the
eddy formed by brisk progress. Critics usefully sharpen
thinking, force reflection, and urge caution in the use of any
tool, perspective, or insight that can be misused. And it is
important to take sound criticism seriously.
Unfortunately, a great deal of criticism is, in this
context, simply unsound. As discussed above, such criticism
often sounds persuasive, because it garners adherents by
bashing straw men positions everyone loves to hate and few, if
any, actually espouse. It is often cloaked in thoroughly
anachronistic rhetoric of human exceptionalism that reflects
more human pride than human sense. There are many new
opportunities for useful evolutionary analysis in law and this is
a good time to pursue them. In doing so we should be mindful
of sound criticism-but alert for flawed contentions that,
unnoticed, might over-deter.
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